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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 1991, the Nebraska Supreme Court declared legislation'
aimed at reimbursing the long-suffering depositors of Nebraska's
failed industrial savings and investment companies unconstitutional.
The court in Haman v. Marsh 2 held that the legislation violated Ne-
braska's prohibition against special legislation.3 The court ruled the
legislation unconstitutional on three grounds. First, the court held
that the legislation created an "unreasonable" classification for legis-
lative purposes and was therefore, special legislation.4 Second, the
1. L.B. 272A, 1990 Neb. Laws 114.
2. 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991).
3. NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 18 provides in pertinent part: "The Legislature shall not
pass local or special laws in any of the following cases, . . . granting to any corpo-
ration, association, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or
franchise whatever... in all other cases where a general law can be made appli-
cable, no special law shall be enacted."
4. The exact line between special and general laws is difficult to distinguish but the
court has attempted to articulate the distinction by stating.
An act is general, and not special or local, if it operates alike on all per-
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court cited the legislation's "closed" classification as an additional rea-
son the legislation was considered "special." Finally, the court held
that the legislation violated the constitutional prohibition against
pledging the credit of the state in support of a private corporation.5
On April 2, 1990, the Governor signed L.B. 272A. The plaintiff,
Gayle Haman, a taxpayer and resident of Nebraska commenced the
action on April 19, 1990 on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, naming the state officials empowered to enact the provisions
of L.B. 272A as defendants.6
Haman asserted four different grounds to support her claim that
L.B. 272A was unconstitutional. First, Haman asserted that the state
had no legal obligation to repay the depositors and absent such an obli-
gation, L.B. 272A created an invalid classification of people who would
benefit by the legislation, thus, constituting special legislation.7 Sec-
ond, Haman claimed that legislation which operates upon a class
whose membership cannot expand or is fixed creates an unreasonable
classification and is special legislations Third, Haman asserted that
L.B. 272A had no regulatory function rationally related to the welfare
of the public and was, therefore, not a justified exercise of the state's
police power. 9 Finally, Haman claimed that L.B.272A unconstitution-
ally used the state's credit to aid a private corporation.10
sons or localities of a class, or who are brought within the relations and
circumstances provided for, if the classification so adopted by the legisla-
ture has a basis in reason, and is not purely arbitrary.
Bauer v. Game, Forestation & Parks Comm., 138 Neb. 436, 441, 293 N.W. 282, 285
(1940).
5. NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 provides in pertinent part: "The credit of the state shall
never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, association, or corporation .... "
This note will not analyze the court's decision regarding the issue of public credit
to corporations. See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91027 (1991). This opinion details
the constitutionality of various restitution options for the depositors in the failed
industrials following the decision in Haman.
6. The defendants, in their official capacities, [hereinafter state] named in the action
were Frank Marsh, former Treasurer of the State of Nebraska; Deb Thomas, Di-
rector of Administrative Services for the State of Nebraska; and Cynthia Milli-
gan, Director of the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance. Briefs were
also submitted by Security Investment Company, as intervenor and successor in
interest to and assignee of State Security Investment Co., and the receiver of
Commonwealth as amicus curiae, in support of L.B. 272A.
7. Brief of Plaintiff at 10-19, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474). The plaintiff relied extensively on case law showing that ret-
roactive legislation, absent a legal obligation on the part of the state, is unconsti-
tutional. See Wakeley v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 191 N.W. 337 (1922);
Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, 231 N.W. 703 (1930); Hubbell Bank v. Bryan, 124
Neb. 51, 245 N.W. 20 (1932); Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
8. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 7, at 20-22.
9. Id. at 22-28.
10. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 15-16, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
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The state claimed that the legislation was a legitimate use of police
power and was supported by a "moral obligation" of the state to repay
the depositors.31 The state further contended that the court could not
rule the classification unreasonable because it was rationally related
to a public purpose as declared by the Legislature and was not perma-
nently closed.12
In reaching a decision, the court outlined what it determined to be
the proper test for legislative classifications challenged as special legis-
lation. Unfortunately, this test is inconsistent with prior decisions and
confusing in its application. Additionally, the court has given a new
meaning as to what constitutes a closed or frozen classification; but by
redefining closed classifications, the court has opened the door to chal-
lenges of classifications found constitutional in prior decisions.
This note will address the questions of what constitutes unreason-
able and frozen classifications and criticizes the rationale used by the
court to reach its decision. The issues of what constitutes a "moral
obligation" and whether the court improperly substituted its own
views for those of the Legislature are issues beyond the scope of this
note.13
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the issues in Haman requires a working knowledge
of the history surrounding Nebraska's failed industrial savings and in-
vestment companies,14 as well as the legislative history of the Ne-
braska Depository Institution Guaranty Corporation (NDIGC).
In 1976, the Nebraska Legislature created the Nebraska Depository
Institution Guaranty Corporation as a "private corporation"1 5 to in-
sure deposits in Nebraska's industrial savings and investment compa-
nies.16 The Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance had the
responsibility of approving NDIGC plans and overseeing the financial
11. Brief of Defendants at 42, Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836
(1991)(No. 90-474).
12. Id.
13. See Mark J. Killenbeck, Through The Judicial Looking Glass: The Nebraska
Supreme Court in Moral Obligation Land And What It Thought It Saw There, 71
NEB. L. REv. 1 (1992). Killenbeck takes an in depth look at the decision in Ha-
man v. Marsh and touches on many facets of the case beyond the scope of this
Note.
14. NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-401 (1987). An industrial loan and investment company
means any corporation incorporated under the laws of Nebraska and which held
a certificate of approval from the Department of Banking and Finance as an in-
stallment investment company on May 23, 1941.
15. See Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990). In Weimer, the court
determined that the NDIGC was a private corporation, not an agency of the state,
and therefore, was not shielded from tort liability.
16. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-17,128 to 21-17,145 (Reissue 1987). The NDIGC was ini-
tially the Nebraska Cooperative Credit Union Guaranty Corporation. L.B. 848
19921
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condition of member institutions.17 The deposits and savings of any
depositor belonging to a member institution would be protected or
guaranteed up to amounts established by the corporation.' 8 Member-
ship in the corporation was limited to depository institutions19
chartered and existing under Nebraska laws.20
Under the statutory scheme, the NDIGC would be funded by mem-
bership fees paid by the participating associations2 ' and "[no] state
funds of any kind shall be allocated or paid to the corporation."22 In-
dividual accounts were initially insured for amounts up to ten thou-
sand dollars, an amount later raised to thirty thousand dollars.23 A
further requirement was that all member institutions display, at their
place of business and in all advertisements, a sign indicating that de-
posits were insured by the corporation.24
On November 1, 1983, Commonwealth Savings Company2 5 was
closed by order of the Nebraska Department of Banking and Fi-
nance.26 The Lancaster County district court declared Common-
wealth insolvent on November 8, 1983 and appointed the Department
as receiver and liquidating agent.2 7
Prior to the Department's approval of Commonwealth as a mem-
ber of the NDIGC, the Department had been aware of the precarious
financial position of Commonwealth, but had failed to undertake any
corrective measures or report Commonwealth's insolvency to other in-
dustrial companies.2 8
§ 1,1976 Neb. Laws 738. In 1977, it was changed to the Nebraska Depository Insti-
tution Guaranty Corporation Act. L.B. 291 § 1, 1977 Neb. Laws 888.
17. The Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance [hereinafter Department]
had the power to approve proposed plans of operation for the corporation and to
promulgate rules necessary to implement the plan. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,136
(1987).
18. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,128 (1987).
19. The definition of depository institutions includes industrial loan and investment
companies. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,131(1)(1987).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,129 (1987).
21. NEa. REV. STAT. § 21-135(3)(1987).
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,135(4)(1987).
23. NEB. REV. STAT.. § 21-17,128(1)(1987).
24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-17,144 (1987).
25. Commonwealth Savings Company was an industrial savings and investment com-
pany. [hereinafter Commonwealth]. The background information on the failed
industrials is derived from the legislative findings in L.B. 272A and the recitation
of facts in Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836 (1991) and Weimer v.
Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 455 N.W.2d 145 (1990). See also Killenbeck, supra note 13, at
15-22.
26. The Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance took possession of Common-
wealth pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-416 and 8-187 (1987).
27. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-416 and 8-198 (1987).
28. See Security Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989). The Depart-
ment was aware of insider loans prior to approving Commonwealth's member-
ship into the NDIGC. Four examinations by the Department and a Federal
[Vol. 71:343
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The Department, acting as receiver, filed two tort claims with the
State Claims Board pursuant to the State Tort Claims Act.29 Both
claims alleged that the negligent, wanton and fraudulent acts of the
State caused the depositors' losses.30 The outcome of those claims was
an eight and one half million dollar ($8.5 million) settlement reached
on September 26, 1985.31 As part of the settlement, the Department
executed a release which waived any further legal claims against the
state and its employees.3 2
In addition to closing Commonwealth on November 1, 1983, the De-
partment publicly ordered all industrials, solvent or insolvent, to re-
fuse to allow depositors to withdraw funds until the depositors'
certificates of indebtedness had matured. By forcing depositors to
withdraw only upon maturity, the Department's order prevented rein-
vestment in any other industrial; thus, the assets of the industrials
were continuously drained until they were forced to merge with other
financial institutions or went bankrupt.33 Two industrials that were
forced to protect themselves under federal bankruptcy statutes were
American Savings Company, of Omaha, and State Securities Savings
Company, based in Lincoln.3 4 Like the Commonwealth depositors, no
one received full payment for their deposits.
On January 4, 1985, the NDIGC turned over all of its assets to the
Commonwealth receiver and since that time, the NDIGC has had no
assets. The total assets of the NDIGC were not nearly sufficient to
satisfy the claims of the Commonwealth, American Savings, or State
Securities depositors.
L.B. 272A was the Legislature's attempt at paying back the deposi-
tors of the failed industrials. Following the signing of the release by
the Commonwealth receiver and the failure of subsequent lawsuits
brought on the behalf of the American Savings and State Securities
depositors, no legal obligation for repayment existed on the part of the
state.3 5 Therefore, the Legislature found that principles of fairness
required Nebraska to fulfill the thirty thousand dollar guaranty for
Bureau of Investigation report alerted the Department of the unethical business
practices and the unsound financial condition of Commonwealth. Id. at 540, 437
N.W.2d at 443.
29. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 (1987).
30. See Weimer v. Amen, 235 Neb. 287, 290-91, 455 N.W.2d 145, 149 (1990). The first
claim asked for $56 million and the second claim asked for damages totalling
$56,433,959.29.
31. Id- at 295, 455 N.W.2d at 152.
32. 1d at 301,455 N.W.2d at 155. The Department had the right to make a settlement
on behalf of the depositors pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-199, 8-1,103, 81-8,223
(1987). See L.B. 1, 1985 Neb. Laws 61.
33. L.B. 272A § 2, 1990 Neb. Laws 114.
34. See American Savings Co. v. State, 230 Neb. xvii (No. 87492, Nov. 7, 1988); Secur-
ity Inv. Co. v. State, 231 Neb. 536, 437 N.W.2d 439 (1989).
35. See supra note 32, and accompanying text.
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each deposit.3 6
At the heart of L.B. 272A was the Legislature's finding that the
acts of the state had "seriously impaired the confidence of the people
of this state in the Legislature and in the enactments of the Legisla:
ture .... 37s These acts were: the Department's failure to take action
against Commonwealth or its officers prior to its closing, the publica-
tion of the order prohibiting industrials from allowing depositors to
remove certificates of indebtedness until maturity; the requirement
that member institutions display notices that accounts were insured
up to thirty thousand dollars by the NDIGC; and the fact that NDIGC
had paid all its assets to the Commonwealth receiver and no depositor
has been paid in full.3 8
Declaring the "necessary public purpose" of the act to be the resto-
ration of the public confidence in the Legislature and financial institu-
tions organized pursuant to its acts,3 9 the Legislature set up a
repayment scheme under which the Department would distribute
money appropriated by the Legislature to the depositors until the
thirty thousand dollar guaranty was met.40 To achieve that end, the
Legislature appropriated sixteen million nine hundred thousand dol-
lars ($16,900,000) from the General Fund for the year July 1, 1990 to
June 30, 1990, and the same for the following year.41
It was against this backdrop that Haman commenced her success-
ful challenge to the constitutionality of L.B. 272A and against which
the court fashioned its decision.
III. ANALYSIS OF HAMAN V. MARSH
The court offered two ways in which legislative acts can violate the
special legislation prohibition. First, the Legislature can create an ar-
bitrary and unreasonable method of classification. Second, the Legis-
lature may create a permanently closed, or frozen class.42
A. Unreasonable Classification
The first prong of the court's attack on L.B. 272A's constitutional-
ity was on the Legislature's designation of persons comprising a
proper class for purposes of the legislation. The court held the classifi-
cation of depositors of failed industrials insured by the NDIGC unrea-
36. L.B. 272A § 2, 1990 Neb. Laws 114, 116 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at § 3.
38. Id. at § 2.
39. I- at § 3.
40. Id. at 117 § 4.
41. Id. at 118 § 7.
42. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 709, 467 N.W.2d 836, 845 (1991).
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sonable and therefore, the legislation was unconstitutional special
legislation.
1. Previous Tests for Valid Classifications
The Legislature has the power to classify objects for purposes of
legislation.43 Historically, the court has given the Legislature wide
discretion in determining what is an appropriate classification.44 How-
ever, the Legislature must adhere to certain rules of classification or
the classification will be held invalid.
To avoid enacting special legislation,45 the Legislature must base
its classification upon some distinction between the group of persons
or objects classified and other persons or objects similarly situated.46
Mandating that distinction exists between the class selected and
others upholds the purpose for the requirement - the prevention of
favoritism by the Legislature.47 It is generally settled that the Legisla-
ture has the power to classify for legislative purposes if the people or
objects classified bear a reasonable,48 or substantial49 distinction from
others similarly situated, and the legislation operates equally upon all
members of the classification.50
Additionally, the classification cannot be "unreasonable"; that is,
the classification must be related to a legitimate purpose of the legisla-
tion.51 It is this rule against unreasonableness and the search for the
proper "test" for class validity that has made the area of special legis-
lation a semantic Gordian knot.
Nebraska case law disgorges a plethora of terms and phrases
describing the proper relationship between a purpose of an act and the
attendant classification. One line of reasoning states that an act is not
43. See Distinctive Printing and Packaging v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566
(1989); City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970); Cox v.
State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
44. State ez rel. Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
45. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
46. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980); State ex rel
Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975); City of Scottsbluff v.
Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970).
47. See 2 NoRmAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.07 (4th
ed. 1986).
48. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976); Gossman v.
State Employees Retirement Sys., 177 Neb. 326, 120 N.W.2d 97 (1964).
49. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment,
237 Neb. 357, 466 N.W.2d 461 (1991); State v. Edmunds, 212 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d
859 (1982); City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970).
50. See generally State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982); State ex rel
Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445,283 N.W.2d 12 (1979); Cox
v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938).
51. State en rel Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 609, 300 N.W.2d 181,187 (1980). "The
test is always whether the things or persons classified by the act form by them-
selves a proper and legitimate class with reference to the purpose of the act." Id.
1992]
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special legislation if the classification "has a basis in reason, and is not
purely arbitrary."52 Additionally, a classification "must rest upon real
differences in situation and circumstances surrounding members of
the class relative to the subject of the legislation which renders appro-
priate its enactment."5 A classification will not be "interfered with
by the courts if real and substantial differences exist which afford a
rational basis for classification." 54 To be valid a classification "must
be based upon some reason of public policy .... that would naturally
suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to
the objects to be classified."55 A classification is proper if it has some
reasonable distinction from other subjects of a like general character,
and the distinction bears some reasonable relation to the legitimate
objectives and purposes of the legislation.5 6 The differences between
the proper relationships are not clear. How much more stringent a
requirement is a "reasonable" relationship than a "rational basis"?
Does "naturally suggest" mean the same thing as "render appropri-
ate"? Adding to the confusion is the tendency of the court to apply
more than one of the tests in a single case.57
What is important is understanding the two step approach the
court has historically taken. First, the class selected must have some
"reasonable" or "substantial" distinction from others similarly situ-
ated. Second, the distinction must provide a "rational basis" for or a
"reasonable relation" to the legislation.
2. The Test in Haman
In Haman, the state asserted the validity of L.B.272A because the
Legislature had a "rational basis" for treating depositors of failed in-
dustrials who were members of the NDIGC as a class.58 The state con-
tended that a classification has a rational basis as long as it is based
"upon real differences in situation and circumstances relative to the
52. State ex rel Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 454, 283
N.W.2d 12, 19 (1979).
53. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 266, 175 N.W.2d 74, 81 (1970); Cox v.
State, 134 Neb. 751, 758, 279 N.W. 482, 486 (1938).
54. State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 386, 318 N.W.2d 859, 862 (1982)(emphasis added).
See also Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119 N.W.2d 298 (1963).
55. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1990).
56. Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976).
57. See State ex rel Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
58. See Brief of Defendants, supra note 11, at 16. The state contended that a classifi-
cation is valid if "the Legislature has a rational basis for establishing the classifi-
cation or there is a valid public policy reason for establishing the legislative
classification." The court refused to accept this proposition claiming that a valid
public policy does not by itself make a classification valid. Haman v. Marsh, 237
Neb. at 711-12, 467 N.W.2d at 846. The court was clearly correct in this determi-
nation. See Killenbeck, supra note 13, at 111-14.
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subject of the legislation which renders appropriate its enactment."5 9
Relying upon the Legislature's factual findings the state argued that
L.B. 272A was enacted in response to "broken promises, misrepresen-
tations, deception, negligence, poor judgment, and turning a blind eye
to an unpleasant reality" and to "real differences surrounding the
members of the class affected and those persons outside the class."60
While conceding that the accuracy of the legislative findings could not
be verified, the state claimed that such verification was unnecessary so
long as the legislative history showed the discussions and findings that
resulted when the legislature created a classification which it deter-
mined was rational based.61 In essence, the state based its argument
on the Legislature's "right"62 to declare a public purpose and to desig-
nate a class of persons "rationally" related to the legislation enacted to
fulfill that public purpose.63
The court asserted that the state had relied upon an erroneous
test.64 According to the court, even though equal protection and the
prohibition against special legislation both emanate from article III,
§ 18 of the Nebraska Constitution, the tests for determining the valid-
ity of classifications challenged under the respective doctrines are
"clearly" not the same.65 According to the court, the "rational basis"
test relied on by the state is only proper when classifications are chal-
lenged under the equal protection doctrine.66 For determining the va-
lidity of classifications made under the "narrower" 67  special
59. Brief of Defendants, supra note 11, at 17.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 17-18.
62. A pivotal issue in most special legislation litigation is when can the court reverse
the Legislature's determination of what constitutes a legitimate public purpose.
As a general rule, the Legislature, as duly elected representatives of the people,
decides what is a public purpose. But when the court disagrees with the Legisla-
ture's finding of public purpose, the court may find a method to substitute its own
opinion for that of the Legislature. See infra notes 106-07, and accompanying text.
63. See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90002 (1990). The Attorney General determined that
the public purpose, as set forth in the Legislature's findings and statement of
intent in L.B. 272A, was to restore public confidence in the Legislature and the
financial institutions of the state. L.B. 272A was deemed to be an appropriate
legislative response to the circumstances surrounding the failed institutions be-
cause restoring public confidence in the integrity and credibility of government
actions works to further the welfare and stability of the state.
64. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 712, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846 (1991).
65. Id.
66. Id. Under equal protection, a classification that does not involve a suspect class or
fundamental right is tested for a rational basis. If a rational relationship exists
between a legitimate state interest and the statutory means selected by the Legis-
lature to fulfill the interest, then the classification is valid. See Distinctive Print-
ing & Packaging Co. v Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989); Drennen v.
Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988); Parker v. Roth, 202 Neb. 850, 278
N.W.2d 106 (1979).
67. The court states that the special legislation prohibition is "narrower" in the sense
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
legislation prohibition, a more stringent test is required.68
Under the more stringent test for the validity of statutes chal-
lenged as special legislation, the statute will be upheld only if it bears
a "reasonable" and "substantial relation" to the purpose of the legisla-
tion.69 The court cites Benderson Development Co. v. Sciortino 7 to
support this proposition. In Benderson, the court found Virginia's
Sunday-closing laws7l constitutional under the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 72 but unconstitutional under
the special legislation prohibitions of the Virginia Constitution.73 The
Benderson court distinguished the test under the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 74 from the special legislation
test on the rationale that the Equal Protection clause has historically
deferred to state laws making economic classifications, 75 while the
prohibition against special legislation, passed to correct a perception
that the General Assembly was swayed by "moneyed interests," is
"aimed squarely" at preventing economic favoritism.76
It is interesting that even though the applicable test had been "suc-
cinctly" set out by prior case law,77 the court felt compelled to search
Virginia case law. The natural question to ask is why did the court not
use the "succinct" Nebraska case law to articulate the proper test?
The probable explanation for the court citing Benderson is that prior
decisions by the Nebraska Supreme Court do not recognize the need
for a separate test and would not have granted the court the degree of
judicial scrutiny it desired.
that it supplements the equal protection theory. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699,
713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846 (1991). See McRoberts v. Adams, 328 N.E.2d 321 (Ml1.
1978).
68. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846-47 (1991).
69. Id. at 713-14, 467 N.W.2d at 847.
70. 372 S.E.2d 751 (Va. 1988). Contra Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 531 N.E.2d 1
(Ill. 1988).
71. Virginia had a statutory scheme wherein business establishments not providing
"necessary" goods or services were not allowed to remain open on Sundays. The
avowed purpose of the statute was to provide Virginians with a common day of
rest "to prevent the physical and moral debasement" of uninterrupted work. See
Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516, 524 (Va. 1961). At the time of the litigation in
Benderson, only twenty percent of the state's employed persons were covered by
the statute. Therefore, the statute was found not to be reasonably and substan-
tially related to the avowed purpose of creating a common day of rest.
72. Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 755 (Va. 1988).
73. VIRGINIA CONST. art. IV, §§ 14, 15.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 756 (Va. 1988). The court as-
serted that because the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted during the period of
Reconstruction to prevent racism the court has been "markedly" deferential to
economic classifications in state laws.
76. Id.
77. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 711, 467 N.W.2d 836, 845-46 (1991).
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In State ex rel. Douglas v. Marsh,78 a case cited by both the state79
and the court, 0 the court ruled legislation creating a fund to reim-
burse governmental subdivisions in several counties for lost revenue
due to property tax exemptions was special legislation.Sl The court
stated: 'Thile the question of classification is one primarily for the
Legislature and in the exercise of this power the Legislature possesses
a wide discretion, there must, nevertheless, be some rational basis for
the classification."8 2 In State ex rel. Douglas v. Gradwohl,83 to deter-
mine that a statute, providing that persons convicted of exceeding the
speed limit by not more than ten miles an hour on interstate high-
ways, was exempt from the normal requirement of paying court costs
was not special legislation, the court stated: "The power of classifica-
tion rests with the Legislature and it will not be interfered with by the
courts if real and substantial differences exist which afford a rational
basis for classification."8 4 Likewise, in State ex rel. Halloran v.
Hawes,8 5 the court ruled a statute based upon differing classifications
of school districts constitutional. 6 The court used the rational basis
test to determine that the statute did not constitute special legisla-
tion.8 7 If the "rational basis" test is, as the court asserts, only used for
classifications challenged under the equal protection doctrine, then
the court has consistently confused the tests. It is, therefore, rather
78. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 300 N.W.2d 181 (1980).
79. See Brief of Defendants supra note 11, at 14.
80. See Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 711, 713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 846-47 (1991). The
court attempted to show that reasonable and substantial circumstances were re-
quired for a classification to be valid. What the court omitted from its cite was
any mention of the test requiring a "rational basis" and "public policy" for the
classification to be valid. See also Killenbeck supra note 13, at 25. (Killenbeck
claims that the omission was due either to seriously defective assistance from the
judicial clerks or a mistaken assumption that no one would read the briefs).
81. L.B. 882, 1980 Neb. Laws 962. The legislation was intended to remedy problems
encountered when Nebraska's Constitution was amended to allow the Legisla-
ture to classify personal property and allow tax exemptions based on the classifi-
cations. See NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. L.B. 882 was to provide money
appropriated by the Legislature to the counties losing tax revenues due to the
exemptions. The problem with L.B. 882 was that the appropriated monies were
based on a county's status as of 1979-1980 with no provision for a change in status
due to an increase or decrease in the amount of personal property exempted. The
court held that L.B. 882 was a "frozen classification" and had no "rational basis."
State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 610, 300 N.W.2d 181, 186-87 (1980).
82. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 607, 300 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1980)(em-
phasis added).
83. State ex reL Douglas v. Gradwohl, 194 Neb. 745, 235 N.W.2d 854 (1975).
84. Id. at 749, 235 N.W.2d at 858 (citing Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753,
119 N.W.2d 298)(emphasis added).
85. State ex reL Halloran v. Hawes, 203 Neb. 405, 279 N.W.2d 96 (1979).
86. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-801 (1987).
87. State ex reL Halloran v. Hawes, 203 Neb. 405,412,279 N.W.2d 96,101 (1979)(citing
McDonald v. Rentfrow, 176 Neb. 796, 127 N.W.2d 480 (1964)).
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disingenuous for the court to claim that the state, having relied upon
prior decisions, used an "erroneous test."
If one accepts the Haman court's assertion that the tests are clearly
different, then one would expect the Nebraska court to have been
careful in distinguishing the proper tests. However, prior case deci-
sions have never been based on a distinction between the tests for
equal protection and special legislation classifications.
In State v. Edmunds88 the court determined the constitutionality
of the motor vehicle inspection statute.8 9 The court never specifically
stated whether the constitutional challenge came under the equal pro-
tection doctrine or the special legislation provision, although a close
reading would lead one to believe that the court was addressing the
issue of special legislation.90 In holding the statute unconstitutional,
the court stated that there was no "rational basis" to uphold the ex-
emptions allowed under the statute.91 Apparently, the Edmunds
court found it unnecessary to distinguish between equal protection
and special legislation challenges because either challenge would re-
quire the same rational basis test.
In Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox,92 the court found a
statute9 3 constitutional which limited the liability of parents whose
children cause intentional personal injury but did not limit the liabil-
ity of parents whose children inflict intentional property damage was
constitutional. The court stated: "Thus article III, § 18, concerns itself
with disparate treatment in much the same manner as does the lan-
guage of U.S. Const. amend. XIV, which prohibits a state from making
or enforcing any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction
'the equal protection of the laws'."94 The court then applied the "ra-
tional basis" test, determining that the statute did not violate either
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the pro-
hibition against special legislation contained in article III, § 18 of the
88. 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1701 (repealed 1981).
90. The court refers to the prohibition against special laws but never mentions equal
protection. In reaching its decision, the court states that the only reason for al-
lowing the exemptions under the statute was the special interest of the owners of
the exempted vehicles. State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 387-88, 318 N.W.2d 859,
863 (1982).
91. IML at 386-87, 318 N.W.2d 859, 860-62. The statute required that vehicles weighing
over five thousand pounds be inspected once a year with the exception of mopeds,
trailers weighing less than five thousand pounds, and farm implements. The
court determined that the exempted vehicles were at least as dangerous as the
vehicles requiring inspection and could find no rational basis for the exemptions.
Id
92. 232 Neb. 846, 443 N.W.2d 566 (1989).
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1988).
94. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v Cox, 232 Neb. 846,849,443 N.W.2d 566, 570
(1989)(citations omitted).
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Nebraska Constitution.95
The Nebraska Supreme Court's interpretation of Article III, sec-
tion 18 in Distinctive cannot be reconciled with the Virginia Supreme
Court's interpretation of Virginia's special legislation provision in
Benderson. Yet, in Haman, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the
Benderson test and, in so doing, implicitly adopted the Virginia court's
rationale.96 The Haman court, in adopting the Benderson test, has put
itself at odds with the Distinctive court which, like the Edmunds
court, found it unnecessary to distinguish between equal protection
and special legislation challenges. It appears that the Haman court,
by confusion or convenience, has adopted a test that has no basis in
prior Nebraska case law and which relies on a distinction that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court has never articulated.
Instead of directly addressing the issue of conflicting case law, the
court chose to exculpate itself by stating: "There has obviously been a
judicial tendency to blur the difference between the two tests, leading
to the present confusion." 97 The court then cites City of Dover v. Im-
perial Casualty & Indemnity Co. 9s to prove its point. It is unclear
whether the court intended to spread the blame for the confusion to
other jurisdictions, and therefore, deflect some of the blame from it-
self. What is clear is that, by citing Dover, the court proved itself quite
capable of blurring its own articulated tests. Even the most tortured
reading of Dover will not support the claim that the court blurred the
tests for classifications challenged under equal protection and special
legislation because nowhere in Dover does the court address the issue
of special legislation. This lack of distinction between the two tests is
not surprising because New Hampshire is one of only ten states to
have no prohibition against special legislation.99 Therefore, Dover is
of no help in determining the proper standard in judging special
legislation.
Readers of the Haman opinion and prior Nebraska decisions will
be confused by the tension existing between Haman and prior deci-
sions. This tension could have been remedied had the Haman court
acknowledged that it was expressly disavowing the tests used in prior
decisions and adopting the rationale behind the Benderson rule. How-
ever, the Haman court chose to simply ignore prior tests from its con-
sideration. The lesson to be learned is that relying upon Nebraska
case law will not guarantee success in special legislation challenges.
The state learned this lesson the hard way when it received the court's
95. Id. at 853, 443 N.W.2d at 572.
96. Supra notes 71-76, and accompanying text.
97. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 713, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991).
98. City of Dover v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280 (N.H. 1990)(Sou-
ter, J., dissenting).
99. See SINGER supra note 47, § 40.01 n. 4 and accompanying text.
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cynical scolding that "ignorance of the law is no excuse and that every-
one is presumed toknow the law."100 If it is true that ignorance of the
law is no excuse, then the court is as guilty as the state.
An important question which arises is how the test is to be applied?
The court does not give much instruction in administering the test. It
is not clear what elements need to be "reasonably and substantially
related." The court asked: "[W]hether payments to a class of failed
industrial company depositors bear a reasonable and substantial rela-
tion to instilling confidence in the Legislature, its enactments, and the
state banking system[?]"O1 Therefore, it is likely that the court
meant that the legislative means chosen - payments to the class of
depositors - must be reasonably and substantially related to the legis-
lative purpose - instilling confidence. The court then posed, but did
not answer,X02 the question of whether a moral obligation provides
reasonable and substantial support for the classification.103 The court
is apparently saying that the underlying obligation must be reasonably
and substantially related to the classification. And finally, the court
determined that the classification must be reasonably and substan-
tially related to the object sought to be accomplished by the legisla-
tion. 0 4 It appears that the means (payment to a class of depositors),
purpose (instilling confidence), underlying obligation (moral), class
(depositors of failed industrials), and object sought to be accomplished,
must all be reasonably and substantially related. If the court retains
the Haman test, it will need to refine the test's requirements. How-
ever, until such refinements are made, the requirement of reasonably
and substantially related remains unduly vague.
If the court intends that the legislative purpose must be reasonably
and substantially related to both the legislative means and the classifi-
cation, the court has definitely changed the rules. As noted, previous
decisions have required that the classification have reasonable and
substantial distinctions that provide a rational basis for classifica-
tion;10 5 but nowhere in prior Nebraska case law is there a requirement
that the class must be reasonably and substantially related to the leg-
islative purpose. This enhanced level of judicial scrutiny is not at all
100. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
101. Id at 714, 467 N.W.2d at 847.
102. The court found no moral obligation. The court determined that a moral obliga-
tion only "attaches" when a law is passed notifying and warning taxpayers and
citizens that the state will undertake the burden of damages. Id. (citing Wakeley
v. Douglas County, 109 Neb. 396, 400, 191 N.W. 337, 339 (1922)). The issue of
whether or not a moral obligation existed in L.B. 272A is beyond the scope of this
note. See also Killenbeck, supra note 13, at 73-74. (Killenbeck asserts that the
court adopted a very narrow view of the holding in Wakeley, and that a moral
obligation existed).
103. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 714, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991).
104. Id. at 715, 467 N.W.2d at 848.
105. Supra note 54, and accompanying text.
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consistent with prior case law or the general principle of allowing the
Legislature wide discretion in making classifications.106 By adopting
an enhanced level of scrutiny the court has limited the Legislature's
discretion and has unilaterally granted unto itself a degree of discre-
tion to use for its own ends. If the Legislature is required to conform
to this enhanced scrutiny, then the Legislature's legitimate use of the
state police power may be inhibited by the court's apparent willing-
ness to substitute its own judgment for that of the Legislature. 07
B. Closed Class
The second attack on the constitutionality of L.B. 272A was the
court's determination that the Legislature had created a "frozen
class." The court began its analysis by reciting the rule from City of
Scottsbluffv. Tiemann'0 8 where that court announced that a classifi-
cation limiting the application of a law to a present condition and leav-
ing no room for future growth of the class, violates the prohibition
against special legislation. 09 With this general rule in mind, to which
both Haman and the state agreed,"1o the court shifted its focus to the
parties' arguments.
Haman, having the burden of proof, argued that L.B. 272A created
a closed class because only through a set of highly unlikely events
could any party ever enter the class."'z The state argued that the act's
plain wording was open-ended112 and a possibility for future growth in
106. State ex reL Douglas v. Marsh, 207 Neb. 598, 606, 300 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1980).
107. The court attacked the Legislature's use of the police power by attacking the pub-
lic purpose of L.B. 272A. "It appears the opposite result of that intended by the
Legislature in enacting L.B. 272A would occur. The act would instill fear rather
than confidence ... The result could be either economic bankruptcy or economic
suffocation." Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 715, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991). Ap-
parently the court is willing to substitute its own views for those of the legislature
and thereby exercise a form of judicial legislation.
108. 185 Neb. 256, 175 N.W.2d 74 (1970). The court stated:
The rule appears to be settled by an almost unbroken line of decisions
stating that a classification which limits the application of the law to a
present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in
the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special, and
a violation of the clause of the constitution above quoted.
Id. at 262, 175 N.W.2d at 79 (quoting State ex reL Conkling v. Kelso, 92 Neb. 628,
139 N.W. 226 (1912)).
109. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 716, N.W.2d 836, 848 (1991).
110. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 7, at 21. Brief of Defendants, supra note 11, at 43.
111. Haman outlined what she deemed to be a highly unlikely, or impossible, series of
events that would need to occur before a party could enter the class. First, new
industrials would need to be chartered. Second, the new industrials would need
to become members of the NDIGC. Third, these industrials would have to go into
bankruptcy or receivership. And fourth, the depositors of these industrials would
need to suffer deposit losses. Reply Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 10, at 14.
112. L.B. 272A refers generally to all depositors of failed member institutions of the
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the class existed; therefore, the class was not closed. 1 3
In determining if the class was closed, the court was not content to
limit itself to examining the face of the legislation, but was intent on
considering the act's application. 14 Such an intent led the court to
proclaim a rule - a court must consider the "actual probability" that
others might enter the class. "If the prospect is merely theoretical, and
not probable, the act is special legislation. The conditions of entry into
the class must not only be possible, but reasonably probable of attain-
ment."115 In applying this rule, the court found the state could not
rely on the form of the act, and the state could not force Haman to
disprove every possible method of a party entering the class. The
court went on to find that except for a highly improbable series of
events including (i) new industrials being chartered, (ii) new industri-
als joining the NDIGC, (iii) new industrials going bankrupt, and (iv)
depositors of those industrials incurring losses, the class was closed.116
On its face, the court's rule that entry into a class must not be only
a theoretical possibility, but must be reasonably probable, has a cer-
tain appeal. The rule appears to favor certainty over mere possibility,
and appears to draw a bright line for legislators. In its own words, the
court will not "accept artful draftsmanship over reality."117 However,
in applying its rule, the court may not find the results so appealing.
The Haman court's reasonable probability test is a departure from
a previously articulated test. In School District No. 46 v. City of Belle-
vue,11 8 the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a statute per-
mitting transfer of territory from one class III school district to
another class III school district, claiming the statute was special legis-
lation. 119 The court articulated the test for lawful classifications as
"not whether a particular entity may exercise a right in a given situa-
tion but, rather, whether the class is so constructed that other entities
may exercise rights and be a part of the class if they acquire the neces-
sary characteristics and meet the necessary prerequisites."120 Under
this line of inquiry, the emphasis is not on the individual seeking entry
into the class but on whether that individual or entity will be provided
the benefit of the legislation once it acquires the needed characteris-
NDIGC and does not refer specifically to the depositors of American, State Secur-
ities, or Commonwealth.
113. Brief of Defendants, supra note 11, at 43, 46.
114. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 717, 467 N.W.2d 836, 849 (1991).
115. Id. at 717-18, 467 N.W.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 716, 467 N.W.2d at 848-49.
117. Id. at 718, 467 N.W.2d at 849.
118. 224 Neb. 543, 400 N.W.2d 229 (1987).
119. NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-801(4)(1987). The plaintiff alleged that the transfer of prop-
erty out of his district increased his financial burden and benefitted taxpayers in
the other district.
120. School Dist. No. 46 v. City of Bellevue, 224 Neb. 543, 400 N.W.2d 229, 234 (1987).
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tics. Therefore, the reasonable probability of entrance into the class is
not a factor to consider when determining the lawfulness of the
classification.
The court relied on several Nebraska cases to support its ruling. In
Axberg v. City of Lincoln,121 the court held unconstitutional a statute
requiring cities of the first class having a paid fire department to pro-
vide pensions for all firemen except those cities that had heretofore
adopted a home rule charter. The classification in Axberg divided
those cities that had adopted home rule charters before the act's pas-
sage from those cities that had not. The exempted cities were a frozen
class and the division of the classification along historical lines vio-
lated the uniformity requirement of article III, section 18 of the Ne-
braska Constitution. 22 A similar situation arose in City of Scottsbluff
where a classification of cities based on the 1960 census was held un-
constitutional because there was no method by which any other city
could ever join the class.- 3
The lesson to be learned from Axberg and City of Scottsbluff is that
if the court determines that an act makes distinctions based on past
events that permanently close the class, the classification will be ruled
invalid because the act fails to operate uniformly. The question of rea-
sonable probability was not at issue in either Axberg or City of Scotts-
bluff because both classes were permanently closed with no chance of
additional members.
The court relied on Republic Investment Fund I v. Town Of Sur-
prise,2 4 an Arizona case dealing with the constitutionality of Ari-
zona's deannexation laws. Surprise does support the proposition that
if it is not probable a city can join the class, the classification will be
held invalid.12 5 However, Surprise also states that a law may be gen-
eral and apply to only one person if that person is the only member of
the legitimate class.-26 Therefore, a reasonable application of Surprise
to L.B. 272A could support the idea that no other members need ever
enter the class if, in fact, the Legislature has already brought all mem-
bers into the class. Therefore, it appears that Surprise is not helpful
in explaining the court's rationale.
The difficulty with the court's rationale in Haman appears most
clearly when applied to cases previously decided by the court. For ex-
ample, in Gossman v. State Employees Retirement System,327 the
121. Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
122. Id. at 64, 2 N.W.2d at 617.
123. City of Scottsbluff v. Tiemann, 185 Neb. 256, 263, 175 N.W.2d 74, 79 (1970).
124. 800 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1990). It is interesting to note that once again the court found
it necessary to go to another jurisdiction to determine the proper test.
125. Id. at 1259.
126. Id. at 1258.
127. 177 Neb. 326, 129 N.W.2d 97 (1964).
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plaintiff claimed that a one percent charge on his monthly salary to
fund a prior service class of employees was special legislation because
the class of prior service employees was permanently closed.128 The
court found that the class was valid and furthered a valid public pol-
icy.1 29 However, if the court in Gossman was forced to labor under the
"reasonably probable" test of Haman, the outcome would have been
different. Under this rule, the class would be closed because it was not
reasonably probable that any person could join the prior service class.
Indeed, it would be impossible to do so.
It is difficult to determine what the court means by "reasonably
probable." The court does not intimate whether a timeframe for ac-
complishing attainment is required, or whether it is sufficient that at
some point in the future it is reasonably probable that another entity
will join the class. This distinction can be brought into focus by look-
ing at Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission.1 3 0 In
Dwyer, the plaintiff contested the constitutionality of a statute that
allowed cities of the metropolitan class, those with a population ex-
ceeding three hundred thousand, to elect a commission that could im-
pose taxes to acquire property. Because Omaha was the only city of
the metropolitan class in Nebraska, the plaintiff argued that the class
was closed. The court held that the class was open, but took cogni-
zance of the fact that the next largest city, Lincoln, had a population
of one hundred fifty-four thousand people.131 It is unclear if the court
would have found it was not only "theoretically" possible, but reason-
ably probable that Lincoln would join the metropolitan class when
Dwyer was decided in 1972. The court leaves unanswered the question
of how long a timeframe is to be considered when determining if it is
reasonably probable that any city will join the metropolitan class. If
the possibility of other cities joining the metropolitan class is only the-
oretical, then the metropolitan class is an invalid classification. And,
if that is the case, the Haman "reasonably probable" test calls into
question the validity of any statute dealing specifically with cities of
the metropolitan class and casts a shadow on the validity of any act
creating a classification based on population.
There are additional problems with the court's requirement that
there be a reasonable probability of new members being able to enter
a class. If the court intends to use this standard in future challenges to
legislative classifications, then the likelihood of such challenges is
greatly increased: Plaintiffs will attempt to trump state public policy
128. The class of prior service employees included those who had been employed by
the state prior to the retirement plan's effective date in 1964 and continuously
since December 1, 1958. Id. at 329, 129 N.W.2d at 100.
129. Id. at 338, 129 N.W.2d at 105.
130. 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236 (1972).
131. Id. at 50, 195 N.W.2d at 248.
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arguments underlying legislative classifications with assertions that
entrance into the disputed class is only theoretical. In the end, the
court will likely invalidate the classifications and undermine the Leg-
islature's public policies.
It is not difficult to imagine the problems the Legislature will con-
front when drafting legislation that is intended to encompass a defined
group. Consider the problems that will result from the Legislature
declaring the need to regulate a previously unregulated industry a
public purpose. If the Legislature attempts to grant a "Grandfather"
exception to certain members of that industry based upon past per-
formance, experience, differences in educational background, or other
relevant factors, it will not be able to do so because the membership of
the class to be "grandfathered" will be permanently closed. Hence,
the Legislature's discretion will be limited. Or, as was the case in
Gossman, suppose the Legislature decides that a valid public purpose
exists for enacting legislation conveying to a defined group a tangible
benefit such as pension or health benefits. Such an act, no matter how
valid the public purpose, will not be valid if entrance into its class is
only theoretical. In essence, the test limits the Legislature's discretion
in making classifications for legitimate legislative purposes.
Due to the problems inherent in the court's "reasonable
probability" test, it is likely that the court will be forced to retreat
from this test. If the court retains this test, it is likely that the number
of successful challenges to legislative classifications will increase.
Ironically, when such successful challenges to legislative classifica-
tions increase, it is probable that the people's confidence in the Legis-
lature and its enactments will be undermined, thereby bringing full
circle the problem that the Legislature was attempting to cure by en-
acting L.B. 272A.
IV. CONCLUSION
Haman adds a new level of confusion to the issue of special legisla-
tion. First, in defining unreasonable classifications as those not rea-
sonably and substantially related to the purpose of the legislation, the
court has invoked a higher level of scrutiny than the rational basis
test, but, by specious distinction, has ignored prior holdings. Second,
in holding that classifications are closed unless it is reasonably prob-
able that others may enter the disputed class, the court has displayed a
lack of foresight that will, in all likelihood, require the court to re-
think its position. In both instances the court has displayed a willing-
ness to override the Legislature's discretion in making legislative
classifications. By not applying tests gleaned from Nebraska case law
to reach its decision, the court may have inadvertently signalled that
precedent has little or no meaning in special legislation challenges.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the court, the next time it's
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faced with a special legislation question, will not avail itself of yet an-
other test to achieve the outcome it desires. Thus, by resorting to tests
that contradict prior case law the court has given the appearance of
adding a disingenuous flavor to its opinion, and has sent an unfortu-
nate, and hopefully unintentional, signal that in the future an act will
be declared special legislation at the whim of the court.
Thomas B. Wood '93
